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OPINION OF THE COURT  
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
The government has been trying to collect unpaid 
taxes assessed against Gary S. Cardaci, and, to that end, it 
sought the judicial sale of the home he owns in New Jersey 
with his wife, Beverly.  The United States District Court for 
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the District of New Jersey concluded that a forced sale would 
be inequitable and instead ordered that Mr. Cardaci make 
monthly rent payments to the government.  Unhappy with 
that outcome, the government has appealed.  The Cardacis, 
who should have been delighted with the decision, have filed 
a cross appeal to challenge both the requirement to pay rent 
and the monthly rental amount.  Even though no sale was 
ordered, the Cardacis also question the authority of the 
District Court to order a sale.  We confirm the District 
Court’s authority to consider whether the Cardacis’ property 
should be subject to a forced sale but will vacate and remand 
for recalculation of Mr. and Mrs. Cardacis’ respective 
interests in the property and reconsideration of the equitable 
factors weighing for and against a sale.1   
I. BACKGROUND 
 
A. Factual Background 
 
Mr. Cardaci was the owner of Holly Beach 
Construction Company (“Holly Beach” or “the Company”).  
                                              
1 Because we remand for the District Court to consider 
again whether to order a sale of the property, we do not 
address in detail the decision to order rental payments.  We 
note, however, that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(c) 
instructs that a “final judgment should grant the relief to 
which each party is entitled, even if the party has not 
demanded that relief in its pleadings.”  Therefore, on remand, 
the District Court is not precluded from considering the 
imposition of rental payments as an alternative remedy 
simply because the government “has not demanded that relief 
in its pleadings.”  Id.  
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In 2000 and 2001, the business began to fail, and, in an effort 
to shore it up, Mr. Cardaci used approximately $49,600 in 
taxes withheld from the wages of his employees to pay 
suppliers and wages rather than payroll taxes.  During that 
two-year period, Mr. Cardaci took approximately $20,000 in 
salary from Holly Beach.  He used that income to support his 
family, including making mortgage payments and paying 
private school tuition for one of his sons.    
 
 The Company eventually folded and Mr. Cardaci tried 
unsuccessfully to start other businesses.  He has not had a 
regular income since 2009.  On top of those financial 
frustrations, he also has medical problems that limit his 
employment options.  Since 2005, Beverly Cardaci has been 
the primary wage earner in the family.  She earns about 
$62,000 a year as a public school teacher.   
 
The Cardacis own property in Cape May County, New 
Jersey, that they purchased in 1978 as their home.  They 
claim no dependents now, but two of their adult children live 
in the house with them at least part of each year.  Their son 
Garrett lives there full time with his wife and three children.  
Garrett earns approximately $37,600 a year.  He emerged 
from bankruptcy a year and a half before the bench trial in 
this case.  He and his wife do not pay rent.  Another son, 
Robert, lives in the house during the summer while he does 
seasonal work.  He earns just under $4,000 a year.     
 
The Cardacis’ house has been their marital domicile 
continuously since they bought it, and the only mortgage on 
the property was paid in full in 2009.  Mr. Cardaci made the 
majority of the monthly mortgage payments from 1978 
through 2005, but, after that, Mrs. Cardaci was the sole payor.  
5 
 
The District Court determined that the house has a fair market 
value of $150,500.  If the house were put to a forced sale, the 
government would set the minimum bid at 60 percent of the 
assessed value, which is $90,300.   
 
At the time of the District Court’s order, Mr. Cardaci 
was fifty-eight and Mrs. Cardaci was sixty-two.  Neither party 
submitted evidence of the Cardacis’ life expectancies, so the 
District Court, using the Social Security Administration’s 
Actuarial Life Table, calculated the expectancies on the 
assumption that they were the same.     
 
 B. Procedural Background 
 
In August 2012, the government brought this action to 
reduce to judgment federal tax assessments against 
Mr. Cardaci and to force the sale of the Cardaci home.2  It 
sought to collect half of the proceeds to pay for Mr. Cardaci’s 
tax liability and to distribute the remainder to Mrs. Cardaci.  
Upon the government’s motion for summary judgment, the 
District Court, recognizing that Mr. Cardaci owed $80,083.87 
plus interest and that the government had a valid lien on the 
Cardaci property, granted partial summary judgment to that 
effect.  The Court also held that the suit was timely because 
an assessment was first made in 2002, and the suit was 
                                              
2 The IRS also sought to recover back taxes from 
Mr. Cardaci’s partner, Lewis J. Morey, and, in addition, it 
sued a drywall company and a building supply company that 
might have had an interest in the Cardaci property.  Neither of 
those two companies, nor Mr. Morey, appeared before the 
District Court, and default judgments were entered against 
them.   
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brought within 10 years of that assessment.  The Court did 
not, however, grant summary judgment with regard to the 
request to foreclose on the property.   
 
Instead, the District Court determined that it had 
“limited discretion” to order an alternative remedy instead of 
a foreclosure sale.  United States v. Cardaci, No. CIV. 12-
5402 (JBS), 2014 WL 7524981, at *6 (D.N.J. Aug. 21, 2014).  
It noted that federal law does authorize such a sale and that 
New Jersey state law treats marital property as at least 
occasionally subject to partition, so the Court recognized that 
it could order a sale of the property, despite Mrs. Cardaci’s 
interest in the property and her objection to foreclosure.  But 
it decided that additional factual development at a trial would 
be needed before it could properly weigh the equities and 
determine whether foreclosure was proper.      
 
 After a two-day bench trial, the Court issued a 
judgment based on its consideration of the equitable factors 
set out in the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. 
Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 710-11 (1983).  The District Court 
examined: (1) “the extent to which the [g]overnment’s 
financial interests would be prejudiced if it were relegated to 
a forced sale of the partial interest actually liable for the 
delinquent taxes;” (2) whether Mrs. Cardaci had “a legally 
recognized expectation that [the] separate property would not 
be subject to forced sale by the delinquent taxpayer or his or 
her creditors;” (3) the likely prejudice to Mrs. Cardaci “in 
personal dislocation costs and … practical 
undercompensation;” and (4) “the relative character and value 
of the non-liable and liable interests held in the property[.]”  
Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 710-11.  It also considered additional 
equitable factors such as the impact a forced sale would have 
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on other non-liable parties.  Ultimately, the Court concluded 
that it would be inequitable to force the sale of the property.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
 
 That conclusion was based in some measure on the 
Court’s method of valuing Mr. and Mrs. Cardacis’ respective 
interests in their home.  In calculating those interests, the 
Court refused to find them equal.  It determined that Mrs. 
Cardaci’s interest in the property, in the event of a forced 
sale, would be eighty-six percent, because she “owns an 
undivided one-half interest in the whole of the property, plus 
a right of survivorship.”  Cardaci, 2014 WL 7524981, at *9.  
Using life estate interest tables published by the Health Care 
Financing Administration in the New Jersey Medicaid 
Manual, the Court decided that Mrs. Cardaci’s life estate 
interest was worth approximately seventy-two percent of the 
value of her interest in the property.  The Court then added 
that life estate value (seventy-two percent times the fifty 
percent value of her interest, to equal thirty-six percent of the 
value of the property) to her one-half survivorship interest 
and concluded that she had an eighty-six percent interest in 
the value of the property, leaving the government to recover 
only fourteen percent of the proceeds from a forced sale.3  
Based on that calculation and consideration of the equitable 
factors from Rodgers, the Court found that “[t]he equities of 
this case warrant the exercise of the Court’s ‘very limited 
discretion not to order a sale.’”  Id. at *17 (citation omitted).  
It therefore fixed an imputed monthly rental value of $1,500 
                                              
3 There are problems with the District Court’s 
calculations that we describe infra at n.8 and accompanying 
text. 
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for the property and ordered Mr. Cardaci to pay half of that 
value to the IRS each month.4   
 
 Shortly after the final judgment was entered, the 
Cardacis filed a motion for reconsideration under Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 59(e).  They argued that the imputed rental value was 
inaccurate and, in support, submitted declarations from two 
different realtors.  Concluding that such evidence should have 
been presented at trial, the District Court refused to 
reconsider its original judgment.   
 
 Mr. Cardaci quickly defaulted on his monthly payment 
obligation.  He also failed to set up an automatic debit 
payment system as required by the District Court, and he 
failed to provide proof of homeowner’s insurance up to the 
balance of the tax obligation, as likewise required.  He has not 
made any of the required payments and has not sought a stay 
of execution of judgment during the pendency of this appeal.   
                                              
4 The IRS also sought an equitable lien on the entire 
property to remain attached in case Mr. Cardaci predeceases 
Mrs. Cardaci.  The Court refused to grant such a lien, 
concluding that the tax obligation would no longer attach to 
the property upon Mr. Cardaci’s death.  To the extent the 
government seeks to challenge that decision on appeal, we 
note that, when a delinquent-taxpayer spouse dies, a federal 
tax lien on property held in a tenancy by the entirety by a 
husband and wife is extinguished and “the surviving non-
liable spouse takes the property unencumbered by the federal 
tax lien.”  Internal Revenue Serv., Notice 2003-60, Collection 
Issues Related to Entireties Property (2003), 2003 WL 
22100950 (2003). 
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 The government filed a timely notice of appeal, as did 
the Cardacis.5  
 
II. DISCUSSION6 
 
A.  Authority of the District Court to Order a  
 Sale 
  
 At the outset, we address the Cardacis’ argument that 
the District Court lacked the authority to even consider 
ordering a sale of marital property held in tenancy by the 
entirety.  It is undisputed that, under New Jersey law, that is 
the character of the Cardacis’ ownership interest.  It seems 
                                              
5 The government initially filed a notice of appeal 
before the District Court judgment became final, which was 
docketed as No. 14-4237.  After the District Court entered a 
final judgment as to the Cardacis, the government again 
appealed, and that appeal was docketed as No. 15-1247.   
Although the judgment was final as to the Cardacis, it did not 
resolve all claims against all parties because Mr. Cardaci’s 
business partner, Mr. Morey, remained.  (See supra n.2.)  
Default judgment was entered against him on August 13, 
2015, which resolved all remaining claims as to all parties.  
The United States and the Cardacis each filed a timely notice 
of appeal from that final judgment, Case Nos. 15-3433 and 
15-3469, respectively.  All four appeals have been 
consolidated.  
 
6 The District Court had jurisdiction under 26 U.S.C. 
§ 7402 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1340 and 1345.  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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obvious, then, that they have rights that qualify as “property” 
subject to the federal tax lien statute, 26 U.S.C. § 6321.  But 
the Cardacis argue that their property is not subject to a 
foreclosure sale because it is protected by a New Jersey 
statute, N.J.S.A. § 46:3-17.4.   
 
There are at least two flaws with their argument.  First, 
that particular New Jersey statute is not applicable to the 
Cardacis.  It was updated nearly thirty years ago by an 
amendment effective January 5, 1988, that includes the 
following language:  “This act shall take effect on the 90th 
day after enactment and shall be applicable to all tenancies by 
entireties which are created on or after the effective date of 
this act.”  1987 N.J. Laws 1661.  Therefore, by its terms, the 
statute applies only to tenancies by the entirety created on or 
after April 4, 1988.  The Cardacis purchased the property at 
issue in 1978.  Thus, the amended and more protective 
version of the New Jersey statute does not apply, and we are 
required to “consider the present matter under common-law 
principles without reference to N.J.S.A. 46:3-17.4.”  Freda v. 
Commercial Tr. Co. of N.J., 570 A.2d 409, 411 (N.J. 1990).   
 
The second and more fundamental flaw in the 
Cardacis’ argument is that, regardless of the applicability of 
New Jersey statutory or common law, state law must give 
way to the supremacy of federal law.  In United States v. 
Craft, 535 U.S. 274 (2002), the Supreme Court made clear 
that “[s]tate law determines only which sticks are in a 
person’s bundle [of property rights].  Whether those sticks 
qualify as ‘property’ for purposes of the federal tax lien 
statute is a question of federal law.”  Craft, 535 U.S. at 278-
79.  Under federal law, an “interest in … entireties property 
constitute[s] ‘property’ or ‘rights to property’ for the purposes 
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of the federal tax lien statute.”  Id. at 288.  State-created 
exemptions are swept aside by the Supremacy Clause of the 
Constitution, which “is as potent in its application to innocent 
bystanders as in its application to delinquent debtors.”  
Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 701.  Therefore, the District Court was 
correct to hold that the marital home constitutes “property” 
subject to the federal tax lien statute.  Craft, 535 U.S. at 288; 
see also Popky v. United States, 419 F.3d 242, 244 (3d Cir. 
2005) (holding that rights to marital property are “property” 
for federal tax purposes when they include “the right to use 
the property, to receive income produced by it, and to exclude 
others from it” (quoting Craft, 535 U.S. at 283)).   
 
B. Analysis of the Rodgers Factors  
 
Since the Cardacis’ marital home is fair game under 
federal tax law, it can indeed be disposed of by a forced sale 
under 26 U.S.C. § 7403(c).  But that statutory subsection 
provides that a court “may decree a sale of such property,” the 
word “may” necessarily implying a degree of discretion.  26 
U.S.C. § 7403(c) (emphasis added).  In United States v. 
Rodgers, the Supreme Court said as much, concluding “that 
§ 7403 does not require a district court to authorize a forced 
sale under absolutely all circumstances, and that some limited 
room is left in the statute for the exercise of reasoned 
discretion.”  461 U.S. at 706.  Rodgers directs that courts 
must order a sale of the property to satisfy a tax lien, unless, 
in light of common sense or special circumstances, it 
determines that a sale would be inequitable.  Id. at 711.  That 
determination is to be guided by four non-exhaustive factors.  
Id. at 710-11.   
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“First, a court should consider the extent to which the 
[g]overnment’s financial interests would be prejudiced if it 
were relegated to a forced sale of the partial interest actually 
liable for the delinquent taxes.”  Id. at 710.  “Second, a court 
should consider whether the third party with a non-liable 
separate interest in the property would, in the normal course 
of events (leaving aside § 7403 and eminent domain 
proceedings, of course), have a legally recognized expectation 
that that separate property would not be subject to forced sale 
by the delinquent taxpayer or his or her creditors.”  Id. at 710-
711.  “Third, a court should consider the likely prejudice to 
the third party, both in personal dislocation costs and in . . . 
practical undercompensation[.]”  Id. at 711.  “Fourth, a court 
should consider the relative character and value of the non-
liable and liable interests held in the property[.]”  Id.  Those 
factors come with the caution that, because they do not 
“constitute an exhaustive list,” they should not “be used as a 
‘mechanical checklist’ to the exclusion of common sense and 
consideration of special circumstances.”  Id.  At the same 
time, however, “the limited discretion accorded by § 7403 
should be exercised rigorously and sparingly, keeping in mind 
the [g]overnment’s paramount interest in prompt and certain 
collection of delinquent taxes.”  Id.   
 
The government argues that the District Court here 
abused its discretion in analyzing the Rodgers factors and 
then erred in concluding that the Cardacis’ home should not 
be sold.  We agree that the District Court erred in its analysis 
of the Rodgers factors but will decline the government’s 
invitation to definitively reweigh the factors ourselves, and, 
instead, we will remand for the District Court to recalculate 
the Cardacis’ property interests and again engage in a 
thorough analysis of the equitable factors set forth in 
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Rodgers.  To assist in that process, we make the following 
observations.7   
 
1. The Prejudice to the Government Resulting 
from a Partial Sale 
 
The first Rodgers factor directs a court to “consider the 
extent to which the [g]overnment’s financial interests would 
be prejudiced if it were relegated to a forced sale of the partial 
interest actually liable for the delinquent taxes.”  Id. at 710.  
In this case, the District Court concluded that that factor 
weighed in the government’s favor “only slightly” because a 
sale of Mr. Cardaci’s interest would provide little value, while 
requiring Mr. Cardaci to pay rental payments to the 
government was “likely to produce much greater collection of 
taxes to the [g]overnment compared with the amount likely to 
be obtained from a foreclosure sale of [the] entire property.”  
Cardaci, 2014 WL 7524981, at *9.  We agree with that 
evaluation of what might be gained by trying to sell 
Mr. Cardaci’s interest in the home, but taking into account 
what might be gained from rental payments was not a sound 
approach in considering this factor.  The focus should solely 
be on determining whether the government would be 
adequately compensated by a partial sale of the taxpayer’s 
interest or whether a sale of the entire property is necessary to 
vindicate the government’s interest.  Rental payments are not 
                                              
7 In explaining the implementation of the factors, we 
suggest how some of them may be assessed, but we do not 
consider them together to determine the result of a weighing 
of the equities.  In other words, we have high confidence in 
the District Court and are not ruling on how the weighing 
process should ultimately come out. 
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the equivalent of a partial sale and are not relevant to the 
contrast between a partial and a total sale. 
 
An analysis of the first factor boils down to the idea 
that, “the higher the expected market price [of a partial 
interest], the less the prejudice, and the less weighty the 
[g]overnment’s interest in going ahead with a sale of the 
entire property.”  Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 710.  When there is no 
market for a partial interest in the property, this factor will 
weigh significantly in favor of a forced sale.  See id.  Because 
there is no real market for one spouse’s interest in a marital 
home held in a tenancy by the entirety (the sale of which 
would leave the purchaser as a tenant in common with the 
remaining spouse), this factor weighs in favor of a forced sale 
of the Cardaci home.   
 
2. The Non-Liable Party’s Legally Recognized 
Expectation in the Property 
 
The second factor directs a court to “consider whether 
the third party with a non-liable separate interest in the 
property would, in the normal course of events[,] . . . have a 
legally recognized expectation that that separate property 
would not be subject to forced sale by the delinquent taxpayer 
or his or her creditors.”  Id. 710-11.  Consideration of that 
expectation requires reference to the protections afforded by 
state law.  See id. at 711 (looking to the protections afforded 
by Texas homestead laws).  The District Court found that, 
because New Jersey law provides special protection for a 
spouse’s interest in marital property, Mrs. Cardaci would 
have expected that her property would be free from 
foreclosure based on her husband’s tax obligations.  
According to the government, however, when the District 
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Court looked to New Jersey state law, it relied upon a statute 
that is “facially inapplicable” and “gave short shrift to the 
unusually weak protections provided by the New Jersey 
tenancy by the entirety[.]”  (Opening Br. at 56.)   
 
In determining the effect of New Jersey law on 
Mrs. Cardaci’s expectations, the Court relied, in part, on 
§ 46:3-17.4 of New Jersey’s statutory code.  But, as already 
noted, that law is only applicable to “tenancies by entireties 
which are created on or after the effective date of th[e] act[,]” 
namely January 5, 1988.  1987 N.J. Laws 1661.  The 
Cardacis’ property was purchased ten years earlier, in 1978.  
Therefore, the government is correct that § 46:3-17.4 is 
inapplicable and, on remand, the District Court should 
“consider the present matter under common-law principles 
without reference to [it].”  Freda, 570 A.2d at 411.   
The government also takes issue with what it 
characterizes as the District Court’s failure to recognize that 
New Jersey provides weak protections for marital property 
held in a tenancy by the entirety.  The expectation of the non-
liable spouse is a matter of degree, because state laws afford 
varying levels of protection.  Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 711.  In 
Freda v. Commercial Trust Co. of New Jersey, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court declined to follow precedent from 
Pennsylvania, Florida, and Georgia because the protections 
for non-liable spouses under New Jersey common law are not 
as strong.  570 A.2d at 413.  Unlike in those states, spouses in 
New Jersey own separate interests that can be reached by 
their individual creditors, so that “the interest of one tenant by 
the entirety is subject to liens on that tenant’s interest.”  Id.  
Nonetheless, the Freda court also recognized that 
“[t]enancies by the entirety … survive as a means of 
protecting marital assets during coverture and as security for 
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one spouse on the death of the other,” and such protection “is 
particularly compelling when the asset is the family home.”  
Id. at 414 (citation omitted).   
 
The most recent case from the New Jersey Supreme 
Court addressing common law rights and the protection of a 
person’s property from a spouse’s creditors – although 
rendered in the context of partition – seemed to focus on the 
equities, without announcing a clear legal right.  The Court 
said that, “when the creditor’s interest in the [marital] 
dwelling is weighed against that of the debtor’s family, 
equitable principles persuade us that the creditor should not, 
as of right, be granted [partition] at the cost of dispossessing 
the family of its home.”  Newman v. Chase, 359 A.2d 474, 
480 (N.J. 1976).   
Consideration of the legally recognized expectations of 
the nonliable spouse is thus “amenable to considerations of 
degree.”  Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 711.  It seems here that it may 
not weigh as fully against a forced sale as it would in a more 
protective state, but it also may not weigh in favor of a sale 
either, as New Jersey law may still discourage selling a 
family home to pay a creditor, depending on the equities.  See 
Newman, 359 A.2d at 480.  On remand, the District Court 
must, of course, rely on applicable New Jersey law in 
discerning the strength of Mrs. Cardaci’s legally recognized 
expectations, given the facts of this case.   
 
3. The Likely Prejudice to the Third Party 
 
The third factor directs a court to “consider the likely 
prejudice to the third party, both in personal dislocation costs 
and in . . . practical undercompensation[.]”  Rodgers, 461 
U.S. at 711.  The District Court focused its inquiry on the first 
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aspect of this factor – personal dislocation costs.  It concluded 
that the factor is neutral because, while Mrs. Cardaci would 
face dislocation costs, the costs were no greater than in any 
other foreclosure sale.  We agree that there are no special 
dislocation costs to consider here.  But it is problematic that 
the Court did not then address the “practical 
undercompensation” Mrs. Cardaci might suffer in the event of 
a forced sale.    
 
The Supreme Court recognized in Rodgers that 
“financial compensation may not always be a completely 
adequate substitute for a roof over one’s head.”  Id. at 704.  
That is particularly true when the market value of the 
property in question “would be less than the price demanded 
by the market for a lifetime’s interest in an equivalent home.”  
Id.  And, because any calculation of the cash value of a 
survivorship interest “must of necessity be based on actuarial 
statistics,” it “will unavoidably undercompensate persons who 
end up living longer than the average.”  Id.  Therefore, to the 
extent that a forced sale of the entire property 
undercompensates the non-liable spouse for the value of her 
life estate and the potential that she lives longer than 
expected, this factor will weigh against a forced sale.  How 
strongly this factor weighs against a forced sale, however, 
will depend on how great the risk of undercompensation is, 
given the particular circumstances.   
 
In order to determine whether an innocent spouse will 
be adequately compensated by a fair distribution of the 
proceeds from a forced sale, a court must first determine the 
amount that the spouse would receive from such a sale.  
Although the District Court here did not consider the practical 
undercompensation to Mrs. Cardaci, it did determine the 
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amount it thought she would receive from a sale because that 
calculation was also necessary to the fourth factor.  It said 
Mrs. Cardaci’s interest in the property was worth eighty-six 
percent of the property’s market value, after adopting the 
mathematical reasoning proposed by the Cardacis.  To 
recapitulate, the Court first recognized that the Cardacis’ 
“survivorship rights are of equal value:  50 percent of the 
property.”  Cardaci, 2014 WL 7524981, at *12.  It then, in 
effect, found Mrs. Cardaci’s life estate to be worth seventy-
two percent of the value of her interest in the property.  
Because Mrs. Cardaci has only a one-half interest in the 
property, that seventy-two percent was divided by two to get 
to thirty-six percent of the value of the whole property.  Since 
Mrs. Cardaci also had a fifty percent interest in survivorship, 
the Court added that fifty percent to the thirty-six percent 
value of the life estate to find that she had an eighty-six 
percent total interest in the value of the property.8  The Court 
                                              
8 One of the difficulties posed by the District Court’s 
calculation was the decision to first value Mrs. Cardaci’s 
interest in the home and to then add the value of a 
survivorship interest on top of that.  In doing so, the District 
Court relied on the Supreme Court’s statement that “interests 
in property, when sold separately, may be worth either 
significantly more or significantly less than the sum of their 
parts.”  United States v. Cardaci, No. CIV. 12-5402 (JBS), 
2014 WL 7524981, at *12 (D.N.J. Aug. 21, 2014) (quoting 
United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 694 (1983)).  But the 
fact that the monetary value of the various interests in the 
property may vary depending on whether they are sold 
together or separately does not mean that the relative values – 
the percentage of the whole – represented by each of those 
interests will, when combined, exceed 100 percent of the 
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did not include Mr. Cardaci’s interest in a life estate in its 
calculations, saying only that, “[a]s to the nonliable spouse[, 
i.e., Mrs. Cardaci], there is an extinguishment of her valuable 
right of life tenancy in that home and her right to withhold 
consent to sale of her home, for which the [g]overnment owes 
just compensation as a taking.”  Id.; see also id. at *14 (“[A] 
forced sale would extinguish property rights presently held by 
the non-liable spouse, for which she must be compensated.”).  
 
The government argues that, based on our decision in 
Popky v. United States, 419 F.3d 242 (3d Cir. 2005), the 
District Court should have determined that each spouse had a 
fifty percent interest in the home, without any consideration 
of their respective life expectancies and future interests in the 
home.  The Cardacis oppose that method of calculation and 
                                                                                                     
market value of the property.  See In re Pletz, 221 F.3d 1114, 
1118 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Because the Debtor and his wife each 
have an undivided life estate in the Property with a right of 
survivorship, the sum of their tenancy by the entirety interests 
must equal 100% of the value of the Property.”).  As an 
economic matter, the market value of a property should 
account for all interests in the home, including survivorship 
and life estate and present possessory interests.  As we 
discuss herein, if the intrinsic value of the life estate to the 
nonliable spouse (i.e., the personal benefit of having a roof 
over one’s head) is out of proportion to his or her interest in 
the market value of the home, then that is a matter to be 
treated as “practical undercompensation,” Rodgers, 461 U.S. 
at 711, and considered in weighing the equities.  It does not, 
however, mean that the life estate assumes a greater 
proportion of the value of the interests in the property. 
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instead defend the calculation of the District Court.  Neither 
position is correct, but the District Court’s overarching 
concern about Mrs. Cardaci being fully and fairly 
compensated is sound and should be weighed under the third 
factor.  
 
Contrary to the government’s argument, Popky is not 
controlling.  In that case, the marital property at issue had 
already been liquidated.  Popky, 419 F.3d at 243.  We 
concluded that the interest of each spouse in the resulting 
cash was an equal fifty percent.  Id. at 245.  Even though the 
cash itself was still held by the spouses as entirety tenants 
under Pennsylvania law, id. at 243, there can be no life estate 
in cash as there can in real property.9  As a result, there was 
no need to turn to actuarial tables.  Id. at 245.   
 
In this case, however, real property and a life estate 
interest in that property are indeed at stake.  To simply apply 
                                              
9 The Sixth Circuit has relied on our decision in Popky 
to find that the same 50/50 rule applied to real property that 
had not yet been sold because the state law similarly provided 
for equal interests in marital assets.  United States v. Barr, 
617 F.3d 370, 373 (6th Cir. 2010).  New Jersey laws likewise 
provides equal rights to property, but the value of a life estate 
and right to survivorship necessarily varies with age.  
Because we must now account for the varying values of those 
rights, the simple approach we used to divide cash in Popky is 
not viable outside the limited situation presented in that case.  
Barr, 617 F.3d at 379 (Batchelder, C.J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (dissenting as to the adoption of Popky 
in the context of real property because “[t]he weight of 
federal law argues strongly against” a blanket 50/50 split).   
21 
 
the same 50/50 rule used for liquidated property held as cash 
would be to ignore a critical interest in the life estate, and 
controlling Supreme Court precedent.  Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 
704 (stating that “any calculation of the cash value of a 
homestead interest must of necessity be based on actuarial 
statistics”).  The Cardacis were counting on being able to live 
in their home all of their lives, regardless of which spouse 
may outlive the other.  The same could not be said for the 
Popkys, who were looking only at a stack of cash.  See id. 
(recognizing “that in practical terms financial compensation 
may not always be a completely adequate substitute for a roof 
over one’s head”).  The Popky rule is thus inapplicable under 
these circumstances.  
 
Although Popky’s simple 50/50 rule does not control, 
we cannot agree with the District Court’s calculation of the 
Cardacis’ respective interests in the marital home.  In a 
tenancy by the entirety, each spouse has a concurrent interest 
in the present value of the property, in a life estate, and in a 
right of survivorship.  See Freda, 570 A.2d at 413.  But 
because both the probability of obtaining the property upon 
the death of one’s spouse and the value of the life estate 
depend on life expectancy, any calculation of the cash value 
of those interests “must of necessity be based on actuarial 
statistics[.]”  Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 704.  That is a logical rule.  
To give one admittedly extreme example, it stands to reason 
that a healthy twenty-six-year-old wife would have a greater 
interest in a life estate than would her ailing eighty-nine-year-
old husband.  While each spouse would have the same rights 
to the home, the measurable property value that they would 
be likely to receive from the property is not the same.  
Therefore, a method of calculation is needed that takes into 
account each spouse’s concurrent interest in the present value 
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and their varying interests in life estate and survivorship 
rights.  See Newman, 359 A.2d at 477 (“[T]he purchaser at an 
execution sale under a judgment entered against a tenant by 
the entirety acquires the right of survivorship of the debtor 
spouse as well as the interest of the latter in the life estate for 
the joint lives of husband and wife.”).   
 
A fair approach must therefore rely on joint-life 
actuarial tables to reflect the interests of both spouses.  See In 
re Pletz, 221 F.3d 1114, 1117-18 (9th Cir. 2000) (following 
the Fifth Circuit in adopting a rule that calculates respective 
interests in marital property using joint-life actuarial tables).  
Such an approach accounts for differences in anticipated life 
expectancies and ensures that the concurrent interests of both 
spouses are correctly calculated, rather than valuing the non-
liable spouse’s interest as if she possessed an exclusive life 
estate.  Id. at 117 (citing United States v. Molina, 764 F.2d 
1132, 1133 (5th Cir. 1985); Harris v. United States, 764 F.2d 
1126, 1130 (5th Cir. 1985)).  Furthermore, it avoids the 
dilemma created by the District Court’s methodology, which 
resulted in a sum of the various interests that exceeded one 
hundred percent of the value of the property.  Cardaci, 2014 
WL 7524981, at *12 (“Mr. and Mrs. Cardaci own property 
interests that, combined, appear to be worth more than 100 
percent of the property.”).  The use of joint-life actuarial 
tables should assist in calculating spouses’ respective interests 
in a way that does justice to both the property owners and the 
government.  And, if a non-liable spouse will be practically 
undercompensated after that method of calculation, that fact 
is an important but separate consideration for the Court to 
take into account.   
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4. The Relative Character and Value of the 
Non-Liable and Liable Interests in the 
Property  
Under the fourth factor, “a court should consider the 
relative character and value of the non-liable and liable 
interests held in the property[.]”  Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 711.  If 
“the third party has no present possessory interest or fee 
interest in the property, there may be little reason not to allow 
the sale[.]”  Id.  “[O]n the other hand, [if] the third party not 
only has a possessory interest or fee interest, but that interest 
is worth 99% of the value of the property, then there might 
well be virtually no reason to allow the sale to proceed.”  Id.  
It is unlikely that, based on life expectancy, the relative 
character and value of the non-liable and liable interests 
would be dramatically different in a tenancy by the entirety, 
unless those life expectancies were also dramatically 
different.  Instead, this factor will more probably come into 
play when the liable party owns only a relatively small 
fraction of the property.  For example, if the liable party 
owned property inherited from a parent as a tenant in 
common with five other siblings, the relative value of the 
property would weigh against a forced sale.  But if the liable 
party owned a mansion on the property while the siblings 
owned only the surrounding land, the character of the liable 
party’s interest might then weigh in favor of a forced sale.   
 
Unlike the siblings in our example, the Cardacis own 
approximately equivalent interests in the property, both in 
terms of the character and value of their interests.  Therefore, 
the fourth factor seems neutral here.  Once the Court 
calculates the relative interests in the property using a joint-
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life actuarial table, it will be in a position to determine more 
precisely how this fourth factor weighs in the balance.   
 
5. Other Equitable Factors 
 
As previously noted, the Supreme Court warned in 
Rodgers that the four equitable factors it focused on are not 
an exhaustive list and should not be “used as a ‘mechanical 
checklist’ to the exclusion of common sense and 
consideration of special circumstances.”  Id.  Despite that, the 
government argues it was improper for the District Court in 
this case to “consider the prejudice to taxpayer’s long-term 
house guests [who] … paid no rent and contributed nothing to 
the carrying costs of the property or the household.”  
(Opening Br. at 60.)  By “house guests,” the government is 
presumably referring to the Cardacis’ son Garrett and his wife 
and three children.  It is an odd label to hang on members of 
an immediate family, but we leave it to the District Court to 
decide how, if at all, the interests of Garrett’s family should 
weigh in the mix. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we confirm the District 
Court’s authority to consider whether a forced sale of the 
Cardacis’ marital property should be ordered, but we will 
vacate and remand for the Court to recalculate the respective 
interests in the marital property and to reconsider the balance 
of equities presented by this case.  
 
